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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The omission of public powers is regarded by Italian academic 
commentators as one of the most troubling topics in administrative law. It is 
a matter of the utmost importance, as the effective enjoyment of many 
fundamental rights depends upon the Public Powers’ activity and it 
presupposes that the administrative procedure resulting from such an activity 
has a regular conclusion. Additionally, Article 41 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union effectively lends focus to the 
                                                 
*  Professor Vera Parisio is full Professor of administrative law at the 
“Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza” of the “Università degli Studi di Brescia” 
(parisio@jus.unibs.it; verapar@tin.it) This text presents, with the appropriate modifications, 
the presentation given during the meeting “Administrative Law Discussion Forum” held at 
Luxembourg University on June 5th and 6th 2012, organized by Prof. Herwig Hofmann. 
Many thanks to Miss Laura Mignone for the help in translating. 
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subject of public authorities’ silence, as it enunciates (among other 
fundamental rights) the right to a good administration.1 The second 
paragraph of the Article states that administration has the obligation to give 
reasons for its decisions.2 It is plain that silence does not permit persons 
affected by the administration’s activities to discover the administration’s 
motivations. 
 Until the enactment of Law No. 241 on August 7, 1990 (“Nuove 
norme in materia di procedimento amministrativo e di diritto di accesso ai 
documenti amministrativi” - New rules regarding the administrative 
procedure and the right to access to administrative documents”),3 no 
specific provision of law regulated administrative procedure in a general 
way.4 Therefore, the legal protection of private individuals was quite difficult 
when public powers omitted to act.5 The situation was made even more 
difficult by the lack of specific rules on the general principles of 
administrative procedure in the Italian Constitution. 
 When drafting Article 97, legislators restricted themselves to 
dictating principles (one on the statutory reserve and one on the pursuit of 
public administration’s good performance) only in the matter of the 
organization of public offices.6 Legislators did not address administrative 
                                                 
1  See Raffaele Bifulco, Diritto ad una buona amministrazione, in COMMENTO 
ALLA CARTA DEI DIRITTI FONDAMENTALI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA 290 (Raffaele Bifulco, Marta 
Cartabia & Alfonso Celotto eds., 2001); ALESSANDRA SERIO, IL PRINCIPIO DI BUONA 
AMMINISTRAZIONE PROCEDURALE (2009). 
2  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 41, Dec. 18, 2000, 
2000 O.J. (C 364) 18. The second paragraph of Article 41 (“Right to good administration”) 
states that “this right includes the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its 
decisions.” Id. Section 3 of Law No. 241/1990 establishes that: 
save in the situations provided for under subsection, every administrative 
measure, including those regarding administrative organisation, staff and 
the conduct of public competitive examinations, must include a statement 
of reasons. The statement of reasons must set out the factual premises and 
the points of law that determined the authority’s decision, as these emerge 
from the preliminary fact-finding activities. 
Legge 7 augusto 1990, n. 241, translated in Catharine de Rienzo, The italian administrative 
procedure act, 2 ITALIAN J. PUB. L. 370, 373 (2010). 
3  The text of Law No. 241/1990 is available (in Italian) at www.normattiva.it. 
For an English translation, see de Rienzo, supra note 2. For a wide analysis of administrative 
procedure as legal institution and for the bibliography as well, see Aldo Sandulli, Il 
procedimento, in TRATTATO DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO: DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO GENERALE 
944 (Sabino Cassese ed., 2000). For commentary to Law No. 241/1990, see CODICE 
DELL’AZIONE AMMINISTRATIVA (Maria Alessandra Sandulli ed., 2011); Giorgio Pastori, The 
origins of law no. 241/1990 and foreign models, 2 ITALIAN J. PUB. L. 257 (2010); Raffaele 
Bifulco, The constitutional importance of law 241/1990, 2 ITALIAN J. PUB. L. 359 (2010). 
4  The legislature had regulated only specific administrative procedure with 
sectoral laws.  
5  In fact, in default of an act that could be appealed, it became impossible to 
address the administrative judge.  
6  Article 97 of the Italian Constitution provides:  
2
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activity, as they thought that regulation of this area could make development 
of Article 97 less fluid. However, little by little, the regulations in Article 97 
became general principles of administrative activity, in order to offer private 
individuals greater protection.  
 Public authorities’ omissions, most significantly in the conclusive 
phase of the administrative procedure, have always posed a threat to the 
private individual who, until the enactment of Law No. 241/1990, could 
count only on the intervention of the administrative courts. The courts, with 
bold judicial creations that will be mentioned hereafter, going beyond the 
letter of the law, tried to force the public officer to act, using the judgment. 
In particular, courts extended some principles set for specific procedures 
(e.g. those in the matter of expropriation) through analogy to other 
unregulated procedures.  
 The irreplaceable role of the administrative courts,7 in particular the 
Council of State,8 has been emphasized since the beginning of the 20th 
century and has manifested itself in judgments that include historical legal 
milestones9 and recent cases.10 Many of the provisions contained in Law No. 
241/1990 are taken from administrative court decisions. 
                                                                                                                   
Public offices are organised according to the provisions of law, so as to 
ensure the efficiency and impartiality of administration. The regulations of 
the offices lay down the areas of competence, the duties and the 
responsibilities of the officials. Employment in public administration is 
accessed through competitive examinations, except in the cases 
established by law. 
Art. 97 Costituzione [Cost.], available at http://www.senato.it/documenti /repository 
/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf. 
7  See PAOLO GROSSI, INTRODUZIONE AL NOVECENTO GIURIDICO 132 (2012) 
(stressing the essential role of the administrative courts). Grossi stressed that not only national 
courts but also the European Court of Justice when using a case method have the task to build 
and protect “the Europe of rights.” Id. at 133. The judge has the role of guardian of the legal 
system’s values and controller of their consistency with the civil society’s ever-changing 
needs.  Id. See also VERA PARISIO, PUBBLICI SERVIZI E FUNZIONE DI GARANZIA DEL GIUDICE 
AMMINISTRATIVO (2003). 
8  The Council of State is “Consiglio di Stato” (the Supreme Administrative 
Court). 
9  For selected important judgments issued by the divisions of the Council of 
State, sitting jointly, see Cons. Stato, sect. IV, 22 augusto 1902, n. 429, Giur. it. 1902, III, 343; 
Cons. Stato, A.P., n. 8/1960; Cons. Stato, A.P., n. 10/1978, available at www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it. 
10  See, e.g., Cons. Stato, A.P., 29 luglio 2011, n. 15, available at www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it. For a commentary to this case, see Maria Alessandra Sandulli, Brevi 
considerazioni a prima lettura dell’Adunanza plenaria del Consiglio di Stato n. 15 del 2011, 
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO (2011); Vera Parisio, “Direttiva Bolkestein,” silenzio-assenso, 
D.I.A:, liberalizzazioni temperate, dopo la sentenza del Consiglio di Stato, ad. Plen. 29 luglio 
2011 n. 15, IL FORO AMMINISTRATIVO T.A.R. 2978–3004 (2011); Enrico Zampetti, DIA e SCIA 
dopo l’Adunanza plenaria n. 15/2001: la difficile composizione del modello sostanziale con il 
modello processuale, DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO, 811–55 (2011). 
3
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 In the situation of a legislative vacuum, the administrative courts, 
first the Council of State alone and then together with the Regional 
Administrative Courts (“Tribunali amministrativi regionali” or “T.A.R.,” 
established in 1971), would not permit the omissions of public authorities in 
the conclusive phase of the administrative procedure to greatly prejudice the 
private individual’s case. However, it must be pointed out that before 
Judgment no. 500 of 1999, passed by the joint sitting of the divisions of the 
Court of Cassation,11 the possibility to obtain compensation for damages in 
cases of inactivity on the part of public administration was practically 
nonexistent. In fact, previously it was supposed that only legitimate interests 
and not subjective rights would arise against the exertion or, better, the lack 
of exertion of power. Only subjective rights, pursuant to the prior 
interpretation given to Article 2043 of the Civil Code by the Court of 
Cassation, could guarantee the compensation of damages.12 
 Since the beginning of the 19th century,13 Italian academic 
commentators of administrative law have been very concerned with 
identifying ways to ensure access to administrative justice in the cases of 
omissions by the public powers because of the lack of specific rules.14 In so 
doing, these commentators contributed to the development of an important 
line of administrative cases.15 Today, the phenomenon of inactivity in the 
execution of administrative procedure is slightly smaller. On the one hand, 
Italian legislators have tried to improve the organization of the offices. On 
                                                 
11  Cass., S.U., 22 luglio 1999, n. 500; see also Vera Parisio, Primi brevissimi 
spunti di riflessione in tema di risarcimento del danno per violazione di interessi legittimi alla 
luce della sentenza della Cass. Sez. Un. n. 500 del 1999, RIVISTA GIURIDICA DELL’EDILIZIA 
1224 (1999) (analyzing this case). 
12  CODICE CIVILE [C.C.] art. 2043. Article 2043 of the Civil Code, which compels 
the author of a malicious or negligent act to compensate resulting damages, could not be 
implemented in cases of failure to issue a measure, as the public administration’s silence 
would not have infringed any subjective right.  
13  Authors who studied administrative inactivity at the beginning of the 20th 
century were deeply influenced by private law literature, as the latter was developed earlier 
than the former. In a private law view, silence kept by the parties is considered to be “non 
facere” without any specific meaning (“qui tacet neque negat, neque utique fatetur”) with 
certain exceptions provided for by law. Among the most ancient, see Oreste Ranelletti, Il 
silenzio nei negozi giuridici, RIVISTA ITALIANA PER LE SCIENZE GIURIDICHE XIII (1892); 
Umberto Borsi, Il silenzio della pubblica amministrazione ed i suoi effetti processuali, 
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE 127 (1932). 
14  ALDO TRAVI, SILENZIO-ASSENSO ED ESERCIZIO DELLA FUNZIONE 
AMMINISTRATIVA (1985). 
15  For a general description of the subject of silence of public administration, see 
ALDO M. SANDULLI, MANUALE DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO 656 (XV ed. 1989); VERA 
PARISIO, I SILENZI DELLA PUBBLICA AMMINISTRAZIONE. LA RINUNCIA ALLA GARANZIA 
DELL'ATTO SCRITTO 39 (1996) [hereinafter PARISIO, SILENZI]; Silenzio della pubblica 
amministrazione, in DIZIONARIO GIURIDICO DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO 229 (Sabino Cassese ed. 
2006); Il silenzio della pubblica amministrazione tra prospettive attizie e fattuali, alla luce 
delle novità introdotte dalla l. 11 febbraio 2005, n. 15 e dalla l. 14 maggio 2005, n. 80, IL 
FORO AMMINISTRATIVO T.A.R. 2798 (2006). 
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the other hand, they have tried to strengthen the public officers’ liability.16 
The need to decrease public spending, which has now reached prohibitive 
levels (120% of the gross domestic product) suggests that petition to the 
administrative courts be made completely residual, as it has become very 
expensive not only for the petitioner but also for the State itself, which must 
face increasingly heavy justice expenses. 
 
II.  LAW NO. 241/1990: THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF TIME 
The enactment of Law No. 241/1990 (called the “Administrative 
Procedure Act”)17 represents the first extraordinary effort to enforce Article 
97 of the Italian Constitution.18 In fact, the principles of “good 
administration,”19 impartiality, and rule of law20 presuppose that there are 
general written rules which provide precise duties to the public powers.  
 An administrative procedure must conclude in due time with a 
written measure. A new consciousness of the importance of time is arising. 
Time has an economic value,21 and therefore public powers have the duty to 
respect the “right”22 to obtain a measure within the time limit provided for by 
                                                 
16  See Legge 4 marzo 2009, N. 150, available at www.normattiva.it (called Law 
Brunetta) (“Delega al Governo finalizzata all’ottimizzazione della produttività del lavoro 
pubblico e alla efficienza e trasparenza delle pubbliche amministrazioni nonchè disposizioni 
integrative delle funzioni attribuite al Consiglio nazionale dell’economia e del lavoro e alla 
Corte dei conti” should be understood as “Enabling act to the Government aiming at the 
optimization of the productivity in public offices and at the efficiency and transparency of 
public administrations as well as work and State Court of Auditors”). 
17  L. N. 241/1990. For a general idea about the codification of administrative 
procedure in Europe, see Sabino Cassese, La partecipazione dei privati alle decisioni 
pubbliche. Saggio di diritto comparato, RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI  DIRITTO PUBBLICO 13 (2007); 
JÜRGEN SCHWARZE, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF EUROPÉEN 1309 (2009). 
18  For a good analysis of Article 97 of the Italian Constitution, including certain 
less recent but ever important studies, see UMBERTO ALLEGRETTI, L’IMPARZIALITÀ 
AMMINISTRATIVA (1965); ANTONIO ANDREANI, IL PRINCIPIO DI BUON ANDAMENTO DELLA 
PUBBLICA AMMINISTRAZIONE (1979); GIORGIO BERTI, LA PUBBLICA AMMINISTRAZIONE COME 
ORGANIZZAZIONE 100 (1968); MASSIMO S. GIANNINI, ISTITUZIONI DI DIRITTO 
AMMINISTRATIVO 112 (1990); CESARE PINELLI, Commento agli artt. 97 e 98, in COMMENTARIO 
ALLA COSTITUZIONE (Giuseppe Branca ed., 1993). More recently, the principle of good 
administration has been studied also in conjunction with the principle of simplification of the 
administrative procedures. See SERGIO PIGNATARO, IL PRINCIPIO COSTITUZIONALE DEL “BUON 
ANDAMENTO” E LA RIFORMA DELLA PUBBLICA AMMINISTRAZIONE (2012); F. Merusi, La 
semplificazione: problema legislativo o amministrativo, 3–4 NUOVE AUTONOMIE 338 (2008). 
19  See Alberto Zito, Il diritto ad una buona amministrazione» nella Carta dei 
diritti fondamentali dell'Unione Europea e nell'ordinamento interno, RIVISTA ITALIANA DI 
DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMPARATO 427 (2002) (discussing the principle of good administration in 
the Italian legal system). 
20  Inactivity of the administration could be considered a breach of these principles 
and a violation of some criminal prescriptions as well. See CODICE PENALE [C.P.] art. 328. 
21  See MARIACONCETTA D’ARIENZO, LA TUTELA DEL TEMPO NEL PROCEDIMENTO E 
NEL PROCESSO (2012). 
22  In our administrative legal system the “right” to obtain a measure in time is not 
a proper right but is considered a legitimate interest. This interest is legally protected only if 
5
Parisio: Italian Administrative Procedure Act
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013
8 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36: 1 
 
law. Before the enactment of Law No. 241/1990, the element of time was not 
as important as it has become. Formerly, an applicant’s only basis for 
complaint was the presence of errors in the measure. A delay in issuing a 
measure did not have any legal consequences. The new importance granted 
to the respect of time is doubtless connected with the need to commence an 
activity as soon as possible, since one might lose money and opportunities 
during any waiting period. This is particularly important at a time like the 
present, when the government must find ways to awaken a sluggish 
economy. 
 The quick diffusion of tacit consent as a way to end the 
administrative procedure confirms this trend. This legal institution is the 
most appropriate to facilitate the development of those activities that need a 
previous authorization. But there is something more to add: silence as tacit 
consent is being, little by little, substituted by the self-declaration model 
(now, the “SCIA” model), that will be clarified hereafter. 
 The enforcement of EU Directive No. 2006/12323 has deeply 
influenced the quick substitution of SCIA for tacit consent in the Italian legal 
system. In Law No. 241/1990, we find all the above mentioned components 
of tacit silence and SCIA. In addition, there are the so-called silence non-
compliance, the so-called tacit denial and, last but not least, the so-called 
“silenzio-devolutivo” (silence which has the effect to modify the original 
competence of the subject in charge of issuing the measure), which only 
apply to internal measures issued during the procedure before its 
conclusion.24 
 In the Italian administrative legal system, Law No. 241/1990, which 
is constantly modified, represents a group of principles aimed at equalizing 
public power and private individuals; when this is not possible, it strengthens 
guarantees for the individual who has to face an administrative power that is 
unilateral by nature.25 This law shows that every action of the public power 
must be carried out with respect for two opposite principles: the need to 
speed up the performance of procedures and the pursuit of “quality” in the 
result of the administrative action. The balance between celerity and quality 
                                                                                                                   
the applicant, according to the factual circumstances, has the titolarity of a substantial 
position. This interpretation derives from the administrative courts’ decisions, especially of 
the joint sitting (Adunanza plenaria) of the divisions of Council of State. See Cons. Stato, 15 
settembre 2005, n. 7, available at www.giustizia-amministrativa.it. 
23  “Bolkestein Directive” 2006/123, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 36 (EC), available at 
www.eur-lex.europa.eu. 
24  See L. n. 241/1990 § 17 (which will be discussed in Section III.B.). 
25  In Law No. 241/1990, important guarantees are provided: Section 7 establishes 
the obligation to communicate the procedures’ commencement to the parties who will be 
directly affected by the final measure (and also to those who are required by law to intervene); 
Section 10 establishes that  the competent authority shall, before the issuance  of a measure 
refusing an application, communicate to the petitioner the reasons for refusing such an 
application; Section 22, finally,  guarantees the right to access to administrative documents. L. 
n. 241/1990. 
6
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is rather difficult, but this tension is inevitable as, in a democratic society, 
both are needed at the same time.26 
 
III.  THE LEGAL REGULATION OF PUBLIC POWERS’ SILENCE 
IN LAW NO. 241/1990 
Even after the modification of the second part of the Italian 
Constitution carried out by the constitutional Law No. 3 of October 18, 2001, 
no explicit legislative competence is mentioned to regulate the general 
principles of administrative procedure. The administrative procedure passes 
across different subjects, and competence follows in relation to them. 
Administrative procedures that deal with regional matters will be stated by 
regions themselves; on the contrary, procedures dealing with statutory 
matters will fall under State competence. 
 Law No. 241/1990 (Section 29) states that regions and local 
authorities regulate administrative procedures pertaining to their respective 
fields of competence, not only pursuant to constitutional principles, but also 
pursuant to principles concerning the guarantees for individuals with regard 
to the administrative action, laid down by Law No. 241/1990.27 
Administrative silence and remedies against it must be equal across the entire 
national territory, even if details such as the duration of the administrative 
procedure vary by region. 
 Before enactment of Law No. 241/1990, the administrative silence 
was considered by law, in a small number of enumerated cases, to be a 
fictitious positive decision (“silenzio-assenso” or tacit consent), or a 
fictitious negative decision (“silenzio-diniego” or tacit denial). When no 
legal provision was provided to qualify silence as equivalent to a positive or 
negative measure, the silence of public administration was regarded as non-
compliance (“silenzio-inadempimento”).28 
 
A. SECTION 2: THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECTING THE TIME LIMIT TO END 
THE PROCEDURE 
It was only in 1990 that Italian legislators expressly codified in 
Section 2 of Law No. 241/1990 the principle that public authorities have the 
                                                 
26  See PARISIO, SILENZI, supra note 15. 
27  L. n. 241/1990 art. 29. Among the guarantees are: the obligation to conclude 
administrative procedures within a scheduled time limit (Section 2, ¶ 2); the obligation upon 
the administration to identify and communicate the name of the officer in charge of the 
administrative procedure (Sections 4–6); the obligation to let private individuals participate in 
the administrative procedure (Sections 7–11); the obligation to guarantee access to documents 
(Sections 22–25). 
28  See VERA PARISIO, L'inerzia della pubblica amministrazione in Italia tra 
procedimento e processo, in SILENZIO E PROCEDIMENTO AMMINISTRATIVO IN EUROPA: UNA 
COMPARAZIONE TRA DIVERSE ESPERIENZE 161 (Vera Parisio ed., 2006) [hereinafter Parisio, 
L’inerzia]. 
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duty to conclude a procedure with an explicit measure and within 30 days, if 
no other different time limit is provided for by law or regulations.29 Since 
then, as a general principle, inactivity of the administration is illegal. 
Although various national administrative bodies can set different time limits 
in compliance with their own needs, such time limits generally cannot 
exceed 90 days. In only very extraordinary cases, the 90-day time limit can 
be extended up to 180 days.30 Section 2, in its most recently updated 
version,31 strongly confirms that the administrative procedure must conclude 
with the adoption of an explicit measure. So, once again, the silence kept by 
public powers, during the procedure or simply in its final phase, is illegal. 
This does not mean that, once the time limit expires, public authorities lose 
the power to issue the due measure, but it implies that the public officer 
becomes responsible for the delay in the adoption of the measure. 
 In fact, the lack of an explicit measure is implicitly considered by the 
legislature as non-compliance (“silenzio-inadempimento”). It is not a 
fictitious negative act but a simple “non facere.” In fact, paragraph 8 of 
Section 2 states that silence kept by public powers is regulated by the 
Administrative Trial Code (“C.P.A.”),32 which governs, in Articles 31 and 
117 of C.P.A., the judge’s ascertainment activity in cases of omission by the 
public administration; this topic will be resumed later. The last change made 
to Section 2 added that, in cases where administrative judgments accepting 
the applicant’s petition against the silence non-compliance of the public 
powers are “res iudicata,” they are immediately sent to the State Court of 
Auditors (“Corte dei conti”).33 This legal rule is extremely important as it 
should strengthen public officers’ liability. 
                                                 
29  L. n. 241/1990 § 2, available at www.normattiva.it. For a very good analysis of 
Section 2, see MARCELLO CLARICH, TERMINE DEL PROCEDIMENTO E POTERE AMMINISTRATIVO 
(1995); Marco Lipari, I tempi nel procedimento amministrativo: certezza dei rapporti, 
interesse pubblico e tutela del cittadino, DIR. AMM. 291 (2003). 
30  See L. n. 241/1990 § 2, ¶ 4. The procedures concerning the acquisition of 
Italian citizenship and those concerning immigration are excluded from the field of 
application of Section 2, paragraph 4. Independent Authorities (e.g. Antitrust – Italian 
Competition Authority, Autorità per l’energia elettrica e per il gas – Regulatory Authority for 
Electricity and Gas, Garante per le comunicazioni - Authority for Communications, and so on) 
can state their own time limits to conclude their respective procedures in a discretionary way. 
However, these time limits have to be reasonable and sustainable. 
31  Legge 4 aprile 2012, n. 35. Section 2 has undergone many changes during 
recent years. In fact, the time limit to conclude the administrative procedure, in compliance 
with Legge 14 maggio 2005, n. 80, had been extended to 90 days and then changed to 30 
days. 
32  Legge 15 febbraio 2010, n. 140. Articles 31 and 117 c.p.a. provide for a special 
type of trial for public authorities' silence. They allow the judge to perform only the binding 
measure in substitution of public bodies. 
33  In the Italian legal system, the Constitution states that Corte dei conti is an 
institution whose role is mainly to safeguard public finance. Art. 100 Cost. Moreover, it 
pursues also a jurisdictional function. Article 100 of the Italian Constitution states that the 
Corte must make an “a priori” audit of the legality of the governmental acts and also an “a 
posteriori” audit of the state budgets management. Id. In the jurisdictional field, Corte dei 
8
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 The State Court of Auditors’ competence means that failing to issue 
the administrative measure within the due time limit can yield economic 
damage; this clear consciousness of the economic value of time can be found 
throughout the entire text of Law No. 241/1990.34 Public officers’ liability 
could be verified under the judgment of liability, which is one of the most 
important tasks of the State Court of Auditors. 
 Paragraph 9 of Section 2 underlines the connection between failing 
to respect the time limit for concluding the administrative procedure and 
public officers’ liability.35 In fact, such failure is one of the most important 
elements in an evaluation of the performance both of the public officer who 
is in charge of the administrative procedure and of his manager.  
 It seems that, after the last modification of Section 2, Italian 
legislators have realized that omissions of public powers are also linked to a 
poor organization of offices. The failed timely conclusion of an 
administrative procedure can be an important sign of a deficiency in the 
management of human and financial resources. Paragraph 9-bis of Section 2 
obliges the government to determine among the chief executive officers the 
one who becomes competent to issue an administrative measure in 
substitution of the inactive officer.36 Moreover, the legal roles contained in 
paragraph 9-bis of Section 2 (concerning the possibility of substituting the 
inactive officer), demonstrate, once again, that the silence of administration 
cannot be considered a fictitious negative act. 
 As the Italian academic commentators of administrative law have 
stressed,37 unfortunately, the communication of the administrative judgment 
to the State Court of Auditors is not a real deterrent to impede omission by 
public powers, given that the liability for damages caused by the public 
administration can be demonstrated only in cases of strong violations of due 
diligence by the public officer. In the Italian legal system, this is difficult to 
                                                                                                                   
conti’s duties are mainly the judgment of responsibility for damages caused to the State or 
other public bodies by their own officers or public administrators. In addition to this 
competence Corte dei conti also decides on cases concerning civil and military pension 
benefits. Last but not least, Corte dei conti rules on special responsibility for accounts, 
connected with the management of public money or property. 
34  See L. n. 241/1990 § 2, ¶ 2 (establishing the obligation to conclude procedures 
within a scheduled time limit); L. n. 241/1990 § 16, ¶ 2 (allowing the administration to 
proceed if the mandatory opinion has not been issued in the due time limit). 
35  L. n. 241/1990 § 2, ¶ 9. Failing to respect the administrative procedure time 
limit does not lead to a withdrawal of the public officer’s power to issue the measure, but 
simply constitutes an evaluation element of the public officer’s performance. See id. 
36  L. n. 241/1990 § 2, ¶ 9-bis. This paragraph also states that every public body 
has the duty to publish on its website the name of the officer who is competent to issue the 
measure in substitution to the officer originally competent so that the private individual can 
obtain the requested measure. Id. 
37  See Marcello Clarich, La certezza del termine del procedimento 
amministrativo: un traguardo in vista o una chimera?, 7 GIORNALE DI DIRITTO 
AMMINISTRATIVO 693 (2012). 
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establish because very often public officers justify their delays by adducing 
reasons such as shortage of office staff and excessive workload, which are 
not verifiable by private individuals. 
 
1.  Section 2-bis: The Delay’s Consequences 
 
Section 2-bis of Law No. 241/1990 states that public bodies are 
obliged to compensate damages caused by fraudulent or negligent non-
observance of administrative procedure time limits.38 All litigation 
concerning the right to recover damages falls within the competence of the 
administrative court. The action for damage compensation must be filed 
within five years.39 
 Section 2-bis constitutes a missed opportunity for the legislature to 
provide for an automatic indemnity in favor of individuals suffering from 
such delays. It should have been established that this automatic indemnity be 
given “ex lege,” without any proof of the negligent or fraudulent behavior of 
public bodies. On the contrary, in the current wording of Section 2-bis, the 
failure to conclude an administrative procedure within due time falls only 
within the compensation of damages judgments.40 The presence of such a 
provision implies that the private individual must actually commence a legal 
action, which has become a very expensive and uncertain undertaking in 
Italy.  
 The text of Section 2-bis is not completely clear because it does not 
specify whether the compensation of damages is granted when the applicant 
lacks the requirements provided for by law to obtain the delayed measure. 
The administrative courts’ decisions strongly affirm that the simple fact that 
public bodies have delayed the administrative measure is not enough to 
guarantee the right to damage compensation.41 
 Administrative courts do not seem to give importance to the passage 
of time itself, whereas in a capitalistic economy based on rational 
computation42 of all costs involved, time itself has an economic value.43 As 
the academic commentators of administrative law have pointed out, neither 
Section 2 nor Section 2-bis offer an effective remedy against public powers’ 
                                                 
38  L. n. 241/1990 § 2-bis. The obligation to compensate damages is due only in 
cases where the petitioner effectively had the right to obtain a favorable measure.  
39  Id. In the Italian legal system, the prescription period of five years means that 
damage has been produced outside a contractual relationship (liability according to lex 
Aquilia). 
40  See id. The recognition of an automatic indemnity would have been much more 
advantageous to the individuals, who, in this way, would not have had to demonstrate the 
officer’s fraud or negligence.  
41  Cons. Stato, A.P., 15 settembre 2005, n. 7, available at www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it. 
42  For instance, the entrepreneur before setting up a new factory has to calculate 
with care the time necessary to obtain the permission to build provided for by law. 
43  See 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMIA E SOCIETÀ 294 (1995). 
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silence. They have some kind of symbolic value, but cannot avoid the 
unpredictability of time and results of the authorization administrative 
procedures. This is a factor that decidedly disadvantages Italy’s economic 
development. The cost of going to court and all the attendant difficulties 
related to proving the negligent or fraudulent behavior of public bodies will 
not spur public powers to consider respecting time limits to be a real 
priority.44 
  
2.  Section 2: Non-Compliance with the Measure (“Silenzio-
Inadempimento”) 
As previously stressed, Section 2 of Law No. 241/1990 sets forth a 
duty to conclude, by an explicit measure, administrative procedures within 
scheduled time limits, and, whenever tacit consent is not applicable,45 silence 
means non-compliance within the given time limit.46  
 The original wording of Section 2 stated, indirectly and when read 
together with Section 20 of Law No. 241/1990, that silence was equivalent to 
non-compliance as a matter of general principle, except for cases in which 
tacit consent or tacit denial were provided for by law.47 This legal rule was 
strictly linked to the principle that administrative procedure has “naturally” 
to be concluded through an express measure, because only through an 
express measure can you verify the line of reasoning followed by the 
administration during the administrative procedure, thus also allowing the 
community to exercise a sort of “social control” over the procedure itself. 
 Since the original wording of Section 2 had to be analyzed in 
conjunction with Sections 19 (DIA then SCIA) and 20 (tacit consent), the 
conclusion was that Sections 19 and 20 represented an extraordinary way of 
concluding a procedure, while Section 2 (silence non-compliance) was the 
ordinary way. On the contrary, in the current text of Law No. 241/1990, 
because of the modifications to Sections 19 and 20 that will be mentioned 
hereafter, the combined interpretation of Section 2 with Sections 19 and 20 
determined that the usual way to conclude an administrative procedure has 
                                                 
44  See Clarich, supra note 37, at 695. 
45  L. n. 241/1990 § 20. 
46  See Aldo M. Sandulli, Questioni recenti in tema di silenzio della pubblica 
amministrazione, FORO ITALIANO III 128 (1949); FRANCO LEDDA, IL RIFIUTO DI 
PROVVEDIMENTO AMMINISTRATIVO (1964); FRANCO G. SCOCA, IL SILENZIO DELLA PUBBLICA 
AMMINISTRAZIONE (1971). These three studies remain an essential starting point for the 
analysis of this kind of silence, even if they are not recent. The quoted Authors, along with 
their studies, have helped administrative courts to overcome the model of tacit denial silence 
in favor of the model of silence non-compliance, since silence of public powers could not be 
considered as an explicit act but as a simple fact (non facere) of public administration. A joint 
sitting of the Council of State finally confirmed this type of silence in 1978. Cons. Stato, A.P., 
n. 10/1978, available at www.giustizia-amministrativa.it. 
47  See L. n. 241/1990 § 2; L. n. 241/1990 § 20. In the original wording, public 
authorities had the obligation to conclude procedures in due time by way of an express 
measure. 
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become tacit consent, while tacit denial is applicable only in the limited cases 
stated by law. In all other cases, when tacit consent is not applicable,48 
silence non-compliance will be implemented.49 This quick diffusion of tacit 
consent is also related to the enforcement of EU directive 2006/123 
(Bolkestein Directive) that will be covered hereafter. 
 Until Law No. 15/2005, in cases of public authorities’ silence, the 
applicant had to challenge the defaulting authority before filing a petition in 
the administrative court. If the applicant received no answer within 60 days, 
he or she could warn the administration to perform the requested measure 
within 30 days. Should the time frame expire without the measure having 
been issued, the applicant could finally have access to the administrative 
court. This system was unsatisfactory for being too slow and essentially 
useless. After the enactment of Law No. 15/2005, which modified Law No. 
241/1990, the applicant can directly accede to administrative court.50 The 
administrative judge, however, cannot infringe the domain corresponding to 
the exercise of administrative discretionary powers. 
 Public administrative silence has the value of a refusal to perform the 
measure only when public bodies are obliged to perform such measure. This 
obligation occurs not only when it is provided for by law, but in every case 
in which the protection of fairness and equity requires it.51 Silence non-
compliance should be sought with a declaration within the time limit related 
to the right for which such judicial protection is sought. Administrative 
courts cannot substitute themselves for the silent administrative bodies 
through issuance of an explicit measure. 
 Resulting from the Italian approach to separation of powers, 
administrative courts cannot order a measure with specific content because 
only public administration is to weigh public interests, and has a democratic 
entitlement to do so. Articles 31 and 117 C.P.A. provide for a special type of 
trial for public authorities’ silence. The time limit to address the 
administrative court is sharply reduced (30 days), when compared with the 
usual 60-day limit. If the public bodies do not act within the time limit, the 
Court appoints a “commissarius ad acta,” that is, a public officer, who 
                                                 
48  See infra Section III.D. 
49  See L. n. 241/1990 § 25, ¶ 4 (providing an example of tacit denial); see also 
infra Section III.E. 
50  See Legge 11 febbraio 2005, n. 15. Once the time limit established to conclude 
the procedure has expired, the invitation to perform is no longer necessary. 
51  See Cons. Stato, sez. V, 13 marzo 2011, n. 1431, available at www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it; T.A.R., Piemonte, 30 luglio 2009, n. 2125, available at www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it; Cons. Stato, sez. V, 21 ottobre 2003, n. 6331, Cons. Stato 2003, I, 2273; 
Cons. Stato, sez. IV, 17 giugno 2003, n. 3405, Cons. Stato 2003, I, 1355; Aristide Police, Il 
dovere di concludere il procedimento e il silenzio inadempimento, in CODICE DELL'AZIONE 
227–46 (Maria Alessandra Sandulli ed., 2011). 
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performs the required measure in substitution of the originally competent 
public administration, (as the court is not allowed to perform it).52 
 
B. SECTION 17: DEVOLUTIONARY SILENCE CONCERNING EXPERT 
EVALUATION 
Section 1753 presents an interesting expression of the so-called 
“silenzio devolutivo” (devolutionary silence) that occurs when the expert 
evaluation required by law or regulation for the adoption of a measure from 
specific offices is not provided within 90 days from the request. The officer 
in charge of the procedure must then request said expert evaluation from 
other organs of a public administration, from public bodies with equivalent 
qualifications and technical ability, or from universities. Therefore, failure to 
give an expert evaluation caused a modification of the competence. This 
modification is not considered in the cases of evaluations that have to be 
produced by authorities responsible for the protection of environment, 
landscape and territory, or public health.54 This type of silence concerning 
the adoption of internal measures represents a quite satisfactory solution, as 
it is not necessary to address a judge, but instead the public powers 
themselves in order to obtain the defaulting evaluation by a different public 
body.  
The system set in Section 17 is different from the one established for 
advisory activities in Section 16.55 In fact, if the opinion requested is not 
given in 20 days starting from the receipt of the request, the officer in charge 
of the procedure can choose between going on independently from the 
expression of the opinion or waiting for it.56 If the opinion concerned is 
optional, then the requesting authority shall proceed without the defaulting 
opinion. If we read Section 16 in conjunction with Section 1 of Law No. 
241/1990 (in which the principle of not making procedures more 
complicated is settled),57 we can see that the legislators disfavor requests of 
optional opinions as they make the procedure more onerous. That is the 
reason why the officer in charge of the procedure must proceed 
independently from the expression of the optional opinion if the time limit 
has expired. In cases of silence in which the required mandatory or optional 
                                                 
52  See Vera Parisio, I Riti Speciali – Section 2 and 3, in IL NUOVO PROCESSO 
AMMINISTRATIVO 664 (Roberto Caranta ed., 2010). 
53  L. n. 241/1990 § 17, available at www.normattiva.it. 
54  L. n. 241/1990 § 17, ¶ 2. Such evaluations cannot be carried out but by the 
competent authority, as its assessment is considered irreplaceable. 
55  See L. n. 241/1990 § 16, available at www.normattiva.it. 
56  Id. It is a discretionary evaluation, which pertains to the officer in charge of the 
procedure, who is, however, obliged to give reasons for proceeding or waiting for the tardive 
opinion.  If the timeframe expires without the optional opinion having been communicated, 
the requesting authority must proceed independently of the expression of opinion. 
57  L. n. 241/1990 § 1, ¶ 2 (“The public administration shall not make a procedure 
more onerous unless extraordinary and justified requirements resulting from the preliminary 
fact-finding activities make such action necessary.”). 
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opinion must be issued by public bodies in matters involving the protection 
of the environment, landscape, territory and public health, the officer in 
charge shall wait until such opinion is issued.58 Otherwise, the public 
administration to which the officer in charge belongs shall address the 
administrative court, as this is a case of silence non-compliance concerning 
an internal measure.59 
 We have seen that the reaction against silence in performing internal 
measures varies in relation to the nature of the requested measure. Only for 
expert evaluations is there a real obligation to ask for a substitution, as they 
are necessary to conclude the preliminary inquiry of the procedure. On the 
contrary, advisory activity is not necessary to complete the procedure, but 
simply to help the public body to make a better decision. However, the 
system described in Section 17 decidedly allows for better “quality” in the 
final measure (even if it makes the procedure longer), as it permits thorough 
knowledge of all the facts and interests involved. The system described in 
Section 16 seems much more flexible because, in the case of an opinion 
requested by law, it depends only on the discretion of the officer in charge of 
the procedure to decide whether research aimed at improving the “quality” of 
the final measure will take precedence over the quick conclusion of the 
procedure. Speed in performing the measure cannot always guarantee its 
“quality,” that is to say, a measure which represents a form of good 
administration. 
 Where the protection of the environment and human health is 
concerned, it is the legislator that decides how the procedure must progress, 
because those values are considered too important to be jeopardized. These 
values prevail on procedural celerity, as set out in Sections 19 and 20, as 
well.60 In fact, one of the most important characteristics of Law No. 
241/1990 is the enhanced value granted to environmental and human health 
concerns, when compared to other important values like the celerity of 
procedure. 
 
C. SECTION 19: THE START-UP ACTIVITY NOTIFICATION (SCIA) 
Section 19 of Law No. 241/1990, like many others, has been 
modified various times during the last twenty years. Section 19 originally 
ruled a different legal system of liberalization, the so-called self-declaration 
                                                 
58  These opinions must necessarily be acquired in the procedure because the 
interests and values implied are deemed to be of the utmost importance. 
59  See Vera Parisio, Parere, in DIZIONARIO DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO, - IL SOLE 
24 ORE (Marcello Clarich ed., 2007); Commento all’art. 16, in CODICE DELL’AZIONE 
AMMINISTRATIVA 695 (Maria Alessandra Sandulli ed., 2011); Silenzio della pubblica 
amministrazione, in DIZIONARIO DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO, - IL SOLE 24 ORE (Marcello 
Clarich ed., 2007). 
60  See L. n. 241/1990 § 19; L. n. 241/1990 § 20. 
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procedure (DIA),61 which now has been replaced by the start-up activity 
notification (SCIA).62 The rules on SCIA directly replace the ones on DIA, 
contained in every state or regional source, even in the field of town planning 
administration. However, SCIA is not applicable in cases involving possible 
endangerment of the environment, health, or landscape.  
 The principles of procedural simplification and liberalization are 
deeply rooted in the Italian legal system,63 and have been strengthened by 
Directive 2006/123/EC.64 They are fundamental principles of administrative 
action65 and fall within the exclusive State legislative competence; therefore 
only agents of State law are competent to rule on SCIA. Regional 
regulations, which may be very different from each other, could lead to a 
distortion of commercial competition. This choice shows once more that the 
traditional legal authorization system is in deep crisis and not sustainable in 
our economy any longer.  
 As for DIA, the individual does not request an authorization, but 
rather he or she communicates the commencement of an activity under his or 
her own responsibility.  Qualified technicians check the compatibility of the 
activity to be commenced with legal requirements.66 Submission of the 
declaration and commencement of the activity are contextual. Public 
authorities, within 60 days, ascertain any possible failure to satisfy the 
requirements provided for by law. In such a case, the administration, with a 
reasoned measure, prohibits prosecution of the activity and imposes the 
                                                 
61  For a more complete portrayal of the institution of DIA, see Aldo Travi, 
Dichiarazione di inizio di attività, in 2 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 343 (2008); Emanuele 
Boscolo, La segnalazione certificata di inizio attività tra esigenze di semplificazione ed 
effettività dei controlli, 3–4 RIVISTA GIURIDICA DELL’URBANISTICA 580 (2010); P. MARZARO 
GAMBA, LA DENUNCIA DI INIZIO DI ATTIVITÀ EDILIZIA (2005). 
62 See Corte Cost., 27 giugno 2012, n. 164, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
63  See Nino Paolantonio, Walter Giulietti & Fiorenzo Liguori, La segnalazione 
certificata di inizio attività, in CODICE DELL’AZIONE AMMINISTRATIVA 749 (Maria Alessandra 
Sandulli ed., 2011) (providing an excellent overview of SCIA while analyzing Section 19 of 
Law No. 241/1990). The SCIA legal institution in its implementation has troubled both public 
powers and individuals as legal rules to apply for the requirements are not clear. See Maria 
Alessandra Sandulli, Dalla D.I.A. alla S.C.I.A.: una liberalizzazione “a rischio,” 6 RIVISTA 
GIURIDICA DELL’EDILIZIA (2010); Semplificazione, certezza del diritto e braccia legate (2005), 
available at www.giustamm.it; see generally EMANUELE BOSCOLO, DIRITTI SOGGETTIVI A 
REGIME AMMINISTRATIVO. L’ARTICOLO 19 DELLA LEGGE 241/1990 E ALTRI MODELLI DI 
LIBERALIZZAZIONE, (2001). 
64  “Bolkestein Directive” 2006/123, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 36 (EC), available at 
www.eur-lex.europa.eu. The “Bolkestein Directive,” or “Directive on Services,” takes its 
name from the Commissioner for internal markets, Frits Bolkestein, who proposed it; it was 
specifically implemented in Italy with d. lgs. No. 59/2010. See infra Part 3.4.1. 
65  See Corte Cost, 9 novembre 2009, n. 282, available at 
www.cortecostituzionale.it; Corte Cost, 16 giugno 2005, n. 236, available at 
www.cortecostituzionale.it. In these judgments, it is stated that simplification of the 
administrative procedure as a general principle falls under the state legislative competence and 
prevails on the principle of state-regions’ shared competence in the field of land-use planning. 
66  See Corte Cost, 27 giugno 2012, n. 164, available at 
www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
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removal of any damaging effect. The administration, however, must grant the 
interested person a time period within which he or she can make the activity 
compliant with existing regulations. 
 As already mentioned, the rules on SCIA pertain to the basic level of 
benefits relating to civil and social entitlements to be guaranteed throughout 
the national territory67 and therefore fall within the exclusive State legislative 
competence.68 This limitation of regional competences is explained by the 
aim of ensuring an undifferentiated enjoyment of civil and social rights 
safeguarded by the Constitution. 
 The immediate performance of activities subject to SCIA underlines 
its qualification as a liberalization institution, and not as an instrument of 
administrative simplification like tacit consent, as will be later shown. In the 
Italian legal system, Article 41 of the Constitution provides for a subjective 
right to conduct economic activities, once the individual has proven 
fulfilment of all requirements, as certified by a qualified technician.69 
Individuals seeking to commence activities of economic interest cannot wait 
for the extended period of time needed for the release of an authorization. 
SCIA and DIA share the same nature, that is to say they are both private acts 
and not tacit authorizations, as the administrative courts’ decisions have 
ruled,70 and in both cases the public authority restricts itself to controlling 
“ex post” the existence of the requirements provided for by law. Just like 
DIA, SCIA also must be accompanied by self-declarations in substitution of 
certificates and attested affidavits, as well as by certifications from qualified 
technicians. 
 Both SCIA and DIA establish that responsibility and all criminal 
consequences resulting from the commencement of an activity in the absence 
of requirements provided for by law, fall on the individual. The legal rule of 
SCIA is different from that of DIA, as after the 60-day time limit has elapsed 
(60 days from the submission of SCIA),71 the public administration can 
intervene only upon imminent danger of severe and irreparable damage to 
the artistic and cultural heritage, environment, health, public security, or 
national defence. Such intervention is subject to a motivated ascertainment of 
the impossibility to protect such interest by firstly making private individuals 
adhere to existing regulations. 
                                                 
67  See Art. 117 ¶ 2(m) Cost. 
68  The legislature itself established that the obligations for public authorities to 
guarantee the individual’s participation in the procedure, to identify the officer in charge, and 
to conclude the procedure within a scheduled time limit represent, pursuant to Article 117 ¶ 
2(m) of the Constitution, the determination of the basic level of benefits relating to civil and 
social entitlements which have to be guaranteed with homogeneity throughout the entire 
national territory. See L. n. 241/1990 § 29, ¶ 2-bis. 
69  See Art. 41 Cost. 
70  See Cons. Stato, A.P., 29 luglio 2011, n. 15, available at www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it. 
71  The time limit is 30 days for SCIA in building matter which is a branch of 
land-use planning. 
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D. SECTION 20: TACIT CONSENT (“SILENZIO-ASSENSO”) 
Section 20,72 like Sections 2 and 19 of Law No. 241/1990, has been 
modified many times during the last years as public powers’ omissions have 
increased and halting economic activity has deeply troubled the Italian 
government. After the enactment of Law No. 80/2005, tacit consent has 
transformed from a legal institution applicable only in peremptory cases 
provided for by a regulation into a general mode of concluding 
administrative procedures. 
 Tacit consent means that administrative inactivity, by virtue of a 
legal provision, becomes equivalent to an explicit measure.73 So the plaintiff 
can commence his or her activity as if an authorization has been issued. This 
explains why the traditional authorization scheme is not affected. The 
responsibility for the illegality of the activity falls on the administration 
(whereas it falls on the individual in the SCIA domain) because the 
administration permitted, with its omission, a fictitious positive act, 
equivalent to an explicit measure, to consolidate itself. By virtue of equating 
silence with an affirmative measure, the individual can carry out his or her 
activity as if the administration had actually issued the requested measure. 
 The model of tacit consent does not aim at judicial review,74 but 
simply at acceleration of the administrative procedure, as tacit consent 
recognizes the rights of the individual concerned. Even if the Italian 
legislators, especially in the implementation of the European Directive 
                                                 
72  L. n. 241/1990 § 20, available at www.normattiva.it. 
73  In Spain, tacit consent is the general way to conclude the administrative 
procedure, with some exceptions strictly provided for by law. The implementation of 
Directive 2006/123 has strengthened this legal institution. See V. Aguado I Cudolà, Silencio y 
procedimiento administrativo en España, in SILENZIO E PROCEDIMENTO AMMINISTRATIVO IN 
EUROPA: UNA COMPARAZIONE TRA DIVERSE ESPERIENZE 41 (Vera Pariso ed., 2006); A. C. 
Nettel Barrera, El silencio positivo en la Directiva de Servicios y los límites a su aplicación en 
la jurisprudencia, 1 REVISTA JURÍDICA DE CATALUÑA (2011); M. Sánchez Morón, Precisiones 
jurisprudenciales sobre el recurso contra la inactividad administrativa (comentario a la 
Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 3 de diciembre de 2008), 43 JUSTICIA ADMINISTRATIVA 49 
(2009); J. Tornos Mas, La nueva acción frente a la inactividad administrativa del artículo 29 
de la Ley de la Jurisdicción contencioso administrativa de 1998. Especial referencia a su 
ámbito objetivo, in LA JUSTICIA ADMINISTRATIVA (2003); A. C. Nettel Barrera, Los 
procedimientos formalizados como ámbito de aplicación del silencio positivo. Comentario a 
la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 28 de febrero de 2007, 18 CUADERNOS DE DERECHO 
LOCAL (2008). 
74  The administrative courts use “silenzio-assenso” (tacit consent) and “silenzio-
accoglimento” (tacit acceptance) with more or less the same meaning. For a general overview 
of tacit consent and for a complete bibliographical reference, see Vera Parisio, Silenzio della 
pubblica amministrazione in DIZIONARIO DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO, - IL SOLE 24 ORE 
(Marcello Clarich ed., 2007); Parisio, L’inerzia, supra note 28, at 161; TRAVI, supra note 14. 
Travi is the author who has analyzed tacit consent in the most accurate way among the Italian 
academic commentators; in his studies he underlines that Section 20 of Law No. 241/1990 
shall be read as a rule in which the theory of “ex lege” legitimation has to be abandoned in 
favor of tacit consent as typical legal evaluation. For an accurate compilation of the theories 
regarding the nature of tacit consent, see PARISIO, SILENZI, supra note 15, at 127–40. 
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2006/123, have looked to annulment when DIA is not applicable, we cannot 
ignore that the conditions required for a possible annulment are strict and not 
very easy to apply. Additionally, third parties (i.e., the neighbor of the 
individual who asks for a building permission) are required to exercise some 
control over the administrative action and to cooperate with the 
administration, which is not always easy. 
 Should third parties consider the tacit consent illegal, they could 
attack it as if it really were a measure and demand its annulment to the judge, 
indicating the date of submission of the application and the time limit within 
which the measure should have been issued. Such proceeding would be an 
annulment trial, in compliance with the traditional model of the 
administrative trial, also confirmed by the Administrative Trial Code 
(C.P.A.).75 In the same way, by virtue of this equation of silence with an 
affirmative act, public powers themselves can use the power of withdrawal 
or of ex officio annulment. 
 Tacit consent does not represent a form of participation of the 
individual with the administrative activity. The aim of tacit consent is to 
avoid individual suffering resulting from the inefficiency of public 
administration. In the current text of Section 20,76 if the public administration 
neither answers within the time limit nor asks for a “service conference,”77 
then silence is equivalent to consent, but with some important exceptions, 
including the protection of environment and health, or when EU legislation 
does not provide for a formal measure, or in the case of tacit denial. The 
exceptions will be identified by one or more governmental decrees. 
 Although the legislators excluded some major subjects from the 
domain of the application of tacit consent, tacit consent has become a 
common way to conclude administrative procedures, in spite of the 
Constitutional Court’s numerous calls to use tacit consent only in very 
limited cases where a low degree of discretion is involved.78 In any event, 
many troubles still exist when one is obliged to choose between tacit consent 
and SCIA, as the rules in Sections 19 and 20 of Law No. 141/1990 are very 
badly written. In compliance with the line of cases of the administrative 
judges, if nothing is particularly prescribed, SCIA shall not be applied if the 
omitted act is discretionary.79 The presence of public powers’ discretion 
discourages the implementation of SCIA; on the contrary, “silenzio-assenso” 
can be acceptable only if discretion is low. The risk deriving from the 
increased use of tacit consent in administrative procedures destined to end 
                                                 
75  Article 29 of the Administrative Trial Code provides for the general annulment 
trial to be exerted within the peremptory time limit of 60 days. 
76  L. n. 241/1990 § 20, available at www.normattiva.it. 
77  A service conference is a formal agreement between two or more public 
administrations, with internal rules and purposes. See L. n. 241/1990 § 14, available at 
www.normattiva.it. 
78  See Corte Cost. 27 gennaio 2006, n. 26, available at www.giurcost.it. 
79  The characteristics of SCIA and the lack of actual protection for third parties 
make SCIA not applicable in cases of discretionary acts. 
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with discretionary acts is loss of the essential content of administrative 
activity, by violating Article 97 of the Italian Constitution. It means a 
violation of the “good administration” principle, as no motivation for using 
public power can be found. 
 
1.  The “Bolkestein Directive” and its Impact on the Italian Legal 
System 
The “Bolkestein Directive”80 was enacted by the European 
Community (now European Union) in order to fully implement the 
fundamental freedoms of establishment and to provide cross-border services, 
as set out in Articles 43 and 49 of the Treaty,81 through the elimination of 
every legal obstacle to the implementation of a real internal market of 
services. The excessively onerous administrative procedures to which the 
exercise of an activity is subject must be rated among those obstacles. 
 This Directive was specifically transposed into the Italian legal 
system with d.lgs no. 59/2010,82 and very recently with d.lgs no. 147/2012.83 
The latter simply specified certain rules already set out in d.lgs. no. 59/2010 
and did not implement anything particularly novel, restricting itself to a 
legislative update in order to clarify the prescriptive frame in force. The 
directive on services, according to its transposition into the Italian legal 
system, has basically transformed the traditional authorization system from 
rule into exception.84 It is linked to Italian government action in the matters 
of liberalization and simplification to facilitate the necessary recovery of the 
competitiveness of the Italian economy. In fact, the directive on services has 
always been considered one of the most important measures to aid economic 
growth since it helps overcome the legal obstacles that stand in the way of 
freedom of establishment and free cross-border services in the Member 
States. 
                                                 
80  “Bolkestein Directive” 2006/123, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 36 (EC), available at 
www.eur-lex.europa.eu. See Jean-Bernard Auby, La transposition de la directive services, 3 
DROIT ADMINISTRIF (2010); Enrico Leonardo Camilli, Il recepimento della direttiva servizi in 
Italia, 12 GIORN. DIR. AMM. 1239 (2010); MICAELA LOTTINI, IL MERCATO EUROPEO, PROFILI 
PUBBLICISTICI (2010). 
81  See Giuliano Fonderico, Il manuale della commissione per l’attuazione della 
direttiva servizi, 8 GIORN. DIR. AMM. 921 (2008). 
82  Decreto Legislativo 26 marzo 2010, n. 59, available at www.normattiva.it. 
D.lgs. stands for decreto legislativo. It is a type of delegated legislation from the parliament to 
the government. 
83  Decreto Legislativo 6 agosto 2012, n. 147, available at www.normattiva.it; see 
Francesco Tuccari, La trasposizione della direttiva” servizi” in Italia alla luce del primo 
decreto correttivo e le recenti riforme anticrisi: verso un mutamento paradigmatico 
d’intervento sulle attività?, available at www.giustizia-amministrativa.it (providing an 
analysis of this legislation). 
84  See NINO LONGOBARDI, IL SISTEMA POLITICO-AMMINISTRATIVO E LA RIFORMA 
MANCATA. TEMI, SINTESI, APPROFONDIMENTI, CONSIDERAZIONI 157 (1999) (strongly underlining 
this point); see also Franco Gaetano Scoca, I provvedimenti autorizzatori, in DIRITTO 
AMMINISTRATIVO 267 (Franco Gaetano Scoca ed., 2011). 
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 Article 17 of d.lgs. 59/2010 states that should there be any overriding 
reasons relating to the public interest (public health, public security, public 
order, etc.), the authorization procedure can lawfully conclude with an 
explicit measure.85 A well-known principle of the Italian legal system (also 
in Sections 16, 19 and 20 of Law No. 241/1990) is confirmed: the protection 
of interests considered extremely important requires the taking of an explicit 
act. In fact, only with an explicit measure can the logical evaluation 
procedure followed by public administration to perform the act be checked. 
When transposing the directive, the Italian legislature clearly gave D.I.A. the 
value of a key reference model, while tacit consent is used only where 
specifically stated. Neither “Silenzio-rifiuto” (silence as non-compliance) nor 
“silenzio-diniego” (silence equivalent to a fictitious negative act) is 
applicable, also because they are in contrast with the philosophy underlying 
the “Bolkestein Directive,” that is to facilitate the transaction of business.86 
 
E.  SECTION 25, PARAGRAPH 4: AN EXAMPLE OF SILENCE AS TACIT DENIAL 
(“SILENZIO-DINIEGO”) 
Section 25, Paragraph 4 of Law No. 241/199087 contains an 
interesting example of tacit denial, that is to say silence considered by law as 
a fictitious negative act.88 It settles that the request to have access to 
administrative documents shall be deemed refused when thirty days has 
                                                 
85  D.L. n. 59/2010 art. 17. The principle, which has already been analyzed in 
relation to Sections 16 and 17 of Law No. 241/1990, is here reaffirmed. Pursuant to this 
principle, authorization procedures linked to the protection of particularly important interests 
(such as health and environment protection) must conclude with an explicit measure, so that 
the important task of controlling the logical evaluation procedure followed by the 
administration to issue the measure can be carried out.  
86  In Greece, the rule of negative legal effects of the administrative silence has 
traditionally been prevalent in the administrative law, with the exceptions of some scattered 
provisions concerning, for example, the supply of electricity and the approval of 
environmental impact studies for which a silent approval of the individual’s petition was 
provided. Nowadays, Greek administrative law seems to be evolving toward the expansion of 
the cases of tacit consent, due to the implementation of Directive 2006/123; this has also 
stimulated important modifications in the Greek system of administrative justice. See 
Chryssoula P. Moukiou, Le renouveau du silence administratif ou ”la quadrature du cercle.” 
Quelques réflexions à propos de la règle du silence-acceptation selon le droit administratif 
hellénique et le droit comparatif, in SILENZIO E PROCEDIMENTO AMMINISTRATIVO IN EUROPA: 
UNA COMPARAZIONE TRA DIVERSE ESPERIENZE 119 (Vera Parisio ed., 2006).   
87  L. n. 241/1990 § 25, ¶ 4, available at www.normattiva.it. 
88  In the French legal system, by tradition, silence has always been considered as 
an implicit rejection of the request. This implicit decision is formed on the basis of a rule of 
law applicable in cases where the administration has remained inactive for a period of two 
months, following a request by the citizen concerned. This fictional decision represents the 
“prerequisite decision” (“decision préalable”) necessary for the quashing proceedings, as well 
as for proceedings concerning substantive disputes. See Camille Broyelle, Le silence de 
l’administration en droit administratif français, in SILENZIO E PROCEDIMENTO 
AMMINISTRATIVO IN EUROPA: UNA COMPARAZIONE TRA DIVERSE ESPERIENZE 3 (Vera Parisio ed., 
2006). 
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passed from the time of request, without any result. In a case of either 
expressly or tacitly denied access, the requesting party has the right to make 
a petition to the Administrative Regional Court (T.A.R.), asking for a 
declaration of his or her right to have access to the requested documents. The 
Administrative Regional Court in first instance and the Council of State in 
appeal (pursuant to Article 116 C.P.A.), after hearing the parties, decide 
within a very short time following a special model of trial in chambers, 
ending with an “actio ad exhibendum” directed to the administration that 
denied the access, if such denial is deemed illegal. 
 Nowadays, cases of tacit denial are very rare, as the philosophy 
underlying this model of silence is to prevent the individual from starting an 
activity without the prescribed authorization. This is sharply in contrast with 
the movement of liberalization and simplification, which is widely spreading 
in the Italian legal system. In compliance with the decisions of the Council of 
State, the model of tacit denial (also called “silenzio-rifiuto” by the judges, 
rather than “silenzio-inadempimento”) was born to make access to the court 
possible, since the administrative trial has always been a quashing 
proceeding. The administrative courts, little by little, have expanded the legal 
protection of the applicant unjustly penalized by the administration’s 
inactivity, through the substitution of silence non-compliance for tacit 
denial.89 
 In a case of silence non-compliance, the legal protection of the 
applicant is easier, as (see Articles 31 and 117 C.P.A.) she or he has a one-
year time period within which to address the court, starting from the moment 
in which the request was presented.90 Once the time limit has expired, the 
equation of silence with a fictitious negative measure would force the 
individual to make a petition to the administrative court within 60 days. So 
the model of tacit denial could be overcome only with a court decision that 
quashed the fictitious illegal measure. The protection of the individual 
concerned was very limited as the time limit of 60 days starting from the 
consolidation of the tacit denial was a peremptory time limit. Moreover, even 
if the fictitious measure had been quashed (but not when discretionary 
powers were involved), an explicit positive measure to commence the 
activity was always necessary, as the judge could not issue the measure 
instead of the public powers. 
 Furthermore, tacit denial entails the risk of presenting silence as an 
ordinary way to conclude administrative procedures, when it should actually 
be considered a sort of “pathological” one, since the “physiology” of the 
system requires an explicit measure, with some exceptions. These are the 
                                                 
89  See Cons. Stato, A.P., 4 dicembre 1989, n. 16, available at www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it; Cons. Stato, A.P., 4 dicembre 1989, n. 17, available at www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it. 
90  Such a time limit is peremptory. 
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reasons why this type of silence is disappearing91 from our legal system and 
has been referenced only in Section 25, paragraph 4. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Even if the Italian legislators have been taking an opposite direction, 
substituting little by little silence non-compliance with tacit consent, and then 
tacit consent, first with DIA and after with SCIA, in my opinion the 
preferable way to conclude the administrative procedure should be with a 
formal act. Only an express measure allows for effective control over the 
way public power is used. 
 Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union recognizes the right to a good administration, and so 
introduces the obligation to give reasons for administrative decisions. In the 
case of discretionary measures, tacit consent (and obviously tacit denial as 
well) would infringe the principle of good administration, now raised to the 
rank of fundamental right. The European Court of Justice’s decisions show 
that the respect of procedural rules, such as that regarding the duty to 
conclude the procedure by an explicit measure, guarantees the correct 
dialogue between authorities and private individuals. 
 The “crisis” of the traditional authorization scheme has contributed 
to the quick diffusion of SCIA, a model of liberalization of economic 
activities. Unfortunately, this model, even if it allows for the immediate 
commencement of activity so that the applicant is not damaged by possible 
omissions of public administration, does not guarantee real legal protection 
for third parties, even if joint sessions of the divisions of Council of State 
have tried to protect the interests of third parties, by introducing “praeter 
legem” new jurisdictional actions, in addition to the traditional quashing 
action.   
 Instead of considering tacit consent as the general way to conclude 
the administrative procedure, the legislature should make a greater effort to 
prevent omissions and better organize public activity, especially when 
discretionary powers are involved. 
 Public powers’ silence still remains an example of 
“maladministration,” which is always a threat to the economic development 
of Italy. The wider diffusion of legal institutions like SCIA, in my opinion, is 
not the best solution to stimulate economic growth. In fact, the risk of losing 
many procedural guarantees is very high, especially when the rules are not 
well written. Moreover, the legal protection of the plaintiff is still limited by 
the restrictions for the administrative courts, in terms of whether they can 
substitute themselves for public authorities when evaluations of the public 
                                                 
91  See Decreto Presidente della Repubblica 20 ottobre 2001, n. 380, art. 37 (called 
“Consolidated law on building”). “Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica” is a kind of 
decree that is ruled by the government and then issued by the President of the Italian Republic. 
22
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss1/2
2013] ITALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 25 
 
interest must be made, even pursuant to the new code of administrative 
procedure.  
 Public administration must be reinvented by introducing new models 
of organization, public officers’ liability must be strengthened, and control 
by the State Court of Auditors must become more effective. 
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